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ABSTRACT 
Products increasingly turn into services. A prime example for this trend is the software industry. Specialized vendors 
leverage their core competencies in service value networks that offer joint complex services to customers. Such service value 
networks are in their infancy, yet both academics and practitioners lack approaches to formalize and economically analyze 
them. Our objective is to reward service providers not only for their inclusion in a particular service rendered, but also for 
their mere presence in the network. Purpose of such a scheme is to incentivize vendors to join the network and to enforce 
certain network characteristics from an operator’s point of view. To this end, we introduce a metric to express the 
contribution of service providers to the whole network – the power ratio. We conduct a simulation to study the evolvement of 
service value networks if vendors maximize their utility based on their power ratio. 
Keywords 
Revenue distribution, service networks, network formation, network evolution. 
INTRODUCTION 
Customers increasingly demand holistic and tailored solutions. In order to handle these changing requirements, companies 
start to re-organize their value creation processes towards joint provisioning of goods and services in ecosystem-like 
environments. Once serving the whole value chain, celebrating what has become famous as vertical integration, companies 
now focus on their core competencies. In related but non-core activities, assets of partners are leveraged. That way, the 
network has the ability to “rapidly pick, plug, and play” business processes (van Heck and Vervest, 2007).  
A prime example for this trend is the software industry. Vendors do not only turn into service providers, benefitting from the 
capabilities of Internet standards and interoperability. They increasingly modularize their core competencies in service value 
networks (SVNs) in order to offer joint complex services which meet specific customer requests. Complex services typically 
involve the assembly and invocation of several component services offered by a multitude of partners in order to complete a 
multi-step business functionality (Papazoglou, 2007). The actual complex service requested by the customer is dynamically 
created from the offerings of a pool of provider candidates. Increasingly, service platforms and marketplaces emerge that 
assemble and manage SVNs – with significant business impact, at this stage already observable in the software industry. 
When preparing the market entry of an SVN, its operator needs to “get on board” both buyers and sellers in order to establish 
a successful business (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). The key challenge is to find a way to exploit so-called network effects, i.e. 
capitalizing the dependency of a network’s value and the number of participants connected to it (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
Service consumers benefit from the quantity and complementarity of service providers on the platform1, leading to greater 
variety and more competitive prices. However, sellers are only willing to register if they expect to come across a sufficient 
number of buyers in the market (Caillaud and Jullien, 2003). 
                                                          
1 In two-sided market theory, the term platform is used for platforms in the wider sense like common hardware or common standards. In 
this article, platform denotes both the marketplace itself and the standards imposed by the platform operator. 
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Thus, a successful SVN requires measures to incentivize participants to join. We present an approach that explicitly 
concentrates on incentivizing the service provider side. Its underlying novelty is to not only compensate those who actually 
contribute to the complex service offered at a time, but also to pay out service providers that are on standby, i.e. partners 
supporting the network’s variety, but actually do not contribute to the complex service rendered. That way, we seek to lower 
the entry barrier for service vendors that face initial costs when developing services compliant to the platform requirements.  
Let ip  denote the price a service provider i  announces to the platform operator. iϕ  denotes the individual percentage of its 
contribution to the network. δ  shall be a surplus that is additionally distributed according to iϕ . Basically, such a scheme r  
could be designed as follows: 
(1) 
, if  player  is allocated
, otherw e
:
is
i i
i
i
p i
r
ϕ δ
ϕ δ
+ ⋅
⋅
⎧= ⎨⎩
 
Certainly, the surplus has to be sponsored by one of the network participants. Therefore, (1) can only be suitable as a 
temporary measure in the initial phase of an SVN.    
In this article we assume that the platform operator grants the surplus. This assumption is built upon several rationales. On 
the one hand, to reach a profitable mass of participants, the platform operator needs to invest in monetary incentives to draw 
in service providers. On the other hand, a payment as described in (1) can be a lever for the platform operator to push the 
network structure to a certain direction. Customers are expected to prefer purchasing services in networks yielding alternative 
offerings such that other providers can dynamically pitch in if an allocated service vendor goes out of business. Hence, the 
platform operator is willing to push the network structure to a situation where, preferably, as many service providers as 
possible are linked with each other. Furthermore, promoting alternative paths through the network leads to a more balanced 
network without single providers having monopolistic positions. In such balanced networks, the platform operator is no 
longer dependent on powerful service providers which could impose pressure by bulling the market or by threatening the 
network with termination of membership. 
In the following, we do not examine the very impact of such a payment scheme to the formation of SVNs. Rather we analyze 
if such a payout rule can, from the platform operator’s point of view, positively affect the network’s structure. 
This paper proceeds as follows: After a literature review and the formalization of service value networks, we propose the 
power ratio as a measure to capture a service provider’s marginal contribution to the SVN. Thereafter, we transfer the power 
ratio to a payment rule and set up research hypotheses concerning its behavior. The subsequent section outlines the 
simulation design, its settings, and the evaluation of its results. We conclude with a summary. 
REWARDING VENDORS’ CONTRIBUTIONS IN SERVICE VALUE NETWORKS 
As stated in the introduction, our objective is to compensate all available sellers in an SVN that are able to fulfill a customer 
request.  
Literature Review 
Cooperative game theory offers a multitude of concepts to deal with the distribution of value among individuals. Considering 
coalition games ( , )V χ  with a finite set of players 1{ ,..., }NV v v=  and a characteristic function χ  which maps a coalition of 
players T V⊆  into real numbers, well-known approaches are, for example, the core and stable sets. Most importantly, both 
concepts assign a set of payments to players which is oftentimes empty or ambiguous. 
The Shapley value differs from above-mentioned approaches. It always provides a unique solution, i.e. a single payment to 
each player which is based on the average marginal contribution she or he yields to a coalition (Shapley, 1953). Hence, it 
denotes the average power or significance of a player iv V∈ . However, the basic assumption in a coalition is that a 
player iv V∈ is able to cooperate with any player jv V∈ . This does not hold true, though, for networks where due to 
functional or strategic restrictions links between players are of prime importance. Myerson (1977) extended the Shapley 
value to network structures. The range of possibilities to form coalitions is reduced to a given network topology G , resulting 
in the following allocation function ( , )iY G χ  for a player iv V∈ as a direct extension of the Shapley value: 
(2)
 
\{ }
!( 1)!
( , ) ( ( { }) ( ))
!ii iT V v
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An assumption inherited from the use of characteristic functions is superadditivity, requiring that a cooperation among more 
players must always be more fruitful than cooperations including fewer members. But what if a smaller cooperation of 
players is able to obtain a certain goal more efficiently? The application of proper characteristic functions does not cover this 
issue. This extension is, in turn, provided by Jackson (2005). He replaces characteristic functions by monotonic covers χˆ  of 
the value function2 for all  'G G⊆  with 'ˆ ( ) max ( ')G GG Gχ χ⊆= .  
Another closely related field of research is network formation. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) analyzed the evolution of social 
and economic networks where self-interested individuals form or sever links. Jackson and Watts (2002) dynamically based 
network formation upon players’ individual improvements resulting from changes in the network topology. Traditionally, 
breaking relationships can be done unilaterally while the formation of links requires consent from both players (Jackson and 
Wolinsky, 1996). Bala and Goyal (2000), however, stated that links can be formed by individual decision under certain 
circumstances. This is also the case in SVNs since service providers cannot influence which other services process their 
outputs. 
To summarize, we base our payment function upon Jackson (2005), include the characteristics of SVNs into the measure, and 
stress the overall network perspective. The formation of SVNs is evaluated given our contribution-based payment.  
Service Value Networks – A Formal Model 
Before economically analyzing SVNs, we need to define an abstract model to formalize them. Importantly, we focus on the 
core process of realizing a complex service without going into process-related details such as parallel or cyclic components. 
The logic of the services’ interaction is depicted in a process model. 
An SVN is represented by a k -partite, directed, acyclic graph ,({ },{ })S f i fG V v v E e= ∪ ∪ ∪ . For simplicity we assume that 
each service is owned by a different service provider. Thus, the set of service providers 1{ , , }NV v v= …  equals the set of 
services present in network G . Two auxiliary nodes sv (source) and fv (sink) serve to formalize complex services as an end-
to-end connection. These nodes are not considered service providers in the network.  
An edge ,i je E∈  denotes an integration relationship between two service providers iv  and jv  (i.e. interoperability of offered 
services and their willingness to cooperate). A service configuration jA  of service jv  is fully characterized by a set of 
M attributes 1{ ,..., }Mj j jA a a=  where mja  is an attribute value of attribute type m . Each ,i je E∈  is annotated with the price 
,i jp  of service jv  when being allocated as successor of service iv . We do not allocate prices to the incoming edges of the 
sink as fv  is not considered a vendor. Consequently, the links ,  with i f ie v V∈  are not included in E . 
Each partition ω  represents a specific class of functionality. Vendors belonging to the same cluster provide a service of the 
same type. Only possible realizations of complex services, i.e. complete paths from source to sink, create value. Since sv  and 
fv  are not considered vendors, the set of paths shall be denoted { }1 ,: ,..., \{ , , }L s f i fF F F G v v e= ⊆ . Let *F F∈ denote the 
allocated path in the network. 
Figure 1 exemplarily formalizes a service value network. The graph illustrates the network of providers and their connections 
which meet the requirements specified by a service requester. 
                                                          
2 Jackson (2005) introduced value functions as a richer object than characteristic functions incorporating both costs and benefits. 
Conte et al.  Enabling Service Networks Through Contribution-Based Value Distribution 
Proceedings of the Fifteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, San Francisco, California August 6th-9th 2009 4 
,1sp 1,3p
2,3p
,2sp 2,4p
1v
2v 4v
3v
1ω= 2ω=
2A
1A
4A
3A
sv fv
 
Figure 1. Formalization of a service value network 
The Power Ratio: Measuring a Vendor’s Marginal Contribution to a Service Value Network  
In analogy to Jackson (2005), we interpret value functions as objects representing costs and benefits. As above-mentioned, 
paths denote feasible complex services. Therefore, the value of paths is the crucial factor when assigning value to a 
cooperation ( , )k k kS V E S= ∈ , ,\{ , , }s f i fS G v v e⊆ . That is, a cooperation jS  with   l j lF S F F¬∃ ⊆ ∀ ∈  is assigned a zero-
value ( ) 0jSχ = . For cooperations  with k j kS S F S∈ ∃ ⊆  we implement a valuation that is directly dependent on the network 
characteristics that create value. As we consider SVNs from an overall perspective, its best path is to create the same value as 
the cooperation that includes the whole network. We suggest waiving the strong assumption of a supperadditive value 
function in favor of a weaker constraint. That is, we accept: 
(3) 11( ) max( ( ),..., ( ))
K
i Ki
S S Sχ χ χ= ≥∪  , iS S∈  
In order to meet (3), we only incorporate vendors that provide additional value when determining χ . That is, as soon as there 
is a cooperation that yields at least one path through G , the path providing the highest value is consulted for the calculation 
of χ . For example, consider a vendor iv  that joins a cooperation 1 1S F⊇ , thereby accounting for a cooperation 2S  yielding 
an additional path 2F . If 1 2( ) ( )F Fχ χ< , then max 2 1 2 2( ) max{ ( ), ( )} ( )S F F Fχ χ χ χ= = . On the other hand, if 1 2( ) ( )F Fχ χ> , 
then max 2 max 1 1( ) ( ) ( )S S Fχ χ χ= = . In the latter case, iv  does not provide additional value to 2S . 
We consider prices ,i jp  and service attributes jA  as the central indicators for the value that is generated. The price of a 
complex service 
lF
P  is determined by aggregating the prices ,i jp  of services situated on lF , that is 
,
,:l i j lF i je F
P p∈=∑ . For 
simplification, we assume equal service attributes jA  of all services. Consequently, value functions are only driven by prices. 
Therefore, we introduce the value function as a function that is monotonically decreasing with rising prices, i.e. a quasi-linear 
approach using max ( ) max l
l
k FF
PS αχ = − , if l kF S∃ ⊆ , lF F∈ , kS S∈  with α  being the service requester’s willingness to 
pay. To further simplify our model, we assume a universal service requester, i.e. α  is sufficiently high and identical for all 
requesters. Thus, we can again simplify χ  as a function : Sχ → \  that reciprocally accounts for the prices of services 
included in the complex service for cooperations kS S∈  as follows: 
(4) ,max
1
(
max , if  , ,
0, otherwise
) : l k
l
l k l kF S
i jFk
F S F S
pS
F Sχ ∈
⎧ ∃ ⊆ ∈ ∈⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
∑  
Let Χ  be the set of all possible value functions. In order to determine the service providers’ power ratios, we define a 
function : nY S ×Χ → \ . Recall that the basis for our consideration is always the cooperation GS  that includes the full graph 
G . Incorporating (4) and the concept of considering the overall network we get (5) as a direct extension of (2). For all 
cooperations iv  can theoretically join (5a), term (5c) takes a positive value whenever iv  is pivotal to it. This value is then 
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weighted by the probability of  the underlying cooperation to form assuming that the sequence of the players to join this 
cooperation is equally likely (5b). 
(5) max , max with \{ }
!( 1)!
( , ) ( ( { , }) ( ))
! kk k i
k k
i G k i S i kS V V v
V V V
Y S S v E S
V
χ χ χ⊂
⎛ ⎞− −= ⋅ ∪ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
 (a) (b) (c)  
The set of incoming edges of a node iv  within a cooperation kS is denoted ,kS iE . As soon as iv  enters a cooperation kS , 
,kS i
E  is also added.  Based on (5), we calculate a service provider’s relative share in the overall productivity of the network 
which we interpret as its power ratio (PR) iϕ  relative to the overall network, i.e. [0;1]iϕ ∈ : 
(6) 
max
( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , ) ( )
i G i G
i G
j G Gj V
Y S Y S
S
Y S S
χ χϕ χ χ χ∈
= =∑  
The individual power ratios 1( ,..., )Nϕ ϕ  sum up to 1. Hence, we do not directly distribute the value created via Shapley-style 
calculations, but rather extract the influence of a single service provider relative to the topology of the whole network.  
A Payment Rule Based on the Power Ratio: Objectives and Research Hypotheses 
Based on (1) and (6), we propose the PR-based payment (PRP) rule as a distribution scheme: 
(7) ,,
, if  , *
, ot
:
herwise
j ii j jPRP
j
j
j
e
r
Fp vϕ δ
ϕ δ
+ ∈⎧ ⋅
⋅
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The determination of the allocated complex service *F  shall not be coupled with the PR and is based on an allocation 
function that picks the most favorable complex service available in the network available from a consumer’s point of view. 
Importantly, we vary the payment rule and concentrate on evaluating the usability of applying a payment scheme that 
considers the whole network structure as presented in (7). Hence we do not yet consider the bidding strategies of service 
providers.  
The design of our PRP rule aims to support the goals pursued by the platform operator. Firstly, a more distributed 
compensation shall incentivize participants to join the SVN (O1). Such incentives will be reinforced if there is not only a 
recurring payment, but also a greater alternation of allocated service providers. Thus, the platform operator is willing to foster 
network agility (O2). Eventually, from a platform operator’s perspective, it is beneficial to foster variety (O3) within the 
network to prevent single service providers from winning too much bargaining power. Furthermore, the more intermeshed 
the SVN, the greater the number of alternative paths which increases reliability by enabling failovers through re-allocation. 
At first sight, it seems favorable for vendors to be linked to as many other service providers as possible when payments are 
made based on (7). Having more connections, a service provider is situated on more paths and is thus more often a vital 
participant when it comes to cooperation formation. However, vendors with a high PR might be reluctant to establish links to 
service providers with less power. Since the power ratios of all network participants are relative, strengthening others can 
result in weakening one’s own position. 
To study the suitability of PR-based revenue distribution, we investigate on how service providers in the SVN maximize their 
utility based on their PR. That is, they are considered as self-interested individuals that form or sever relationships to 
maximize their benefits. Whether services are connected depends on two factors: functional and strategic criteria. Functional 
integration is given due to common standards imposed by the platform. However, the platform operator cannot dictate how 
sellers are to connect their services to complementary ones. Thus, each service provider can choose its linkage strategy to 
directly anteceding service providers.  
In order to compare our PRP rule to more traditional notions of distributing payments, we consider a simple payment 
exclusively rewarding allocated service providers, that is a purely allocation based payment (AP) rule:  
(8) 
*
,, , if  ,
0, otherwise
j i jAP i j
j
p v e F
r = ⎧ ∈⎨⎩
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The payment function as shown in (8) is analogue to a first price auction. The sellers providing the component services that 
are situated at *F  receive their announced price.  
Above-stated considerations lead to the following research question: Is a payment scheme incorporating the power ratio 
feasible to diminish concentration and to foster agility and variety in SVNs?  
Derived from this research question, we state the following hypotheses:  
H1:  PR-based payments account for diminished concentration of distributed payments compared to a purely allocation-
based payment (cf. O1).  
H2: PR-based payments account for increased dynamics and agility in the network compared to a purely allocation-based 
payment (cf. O2).   
H3: PR-based payments account for a higher degree of variety compared to a purely allocation-based payment (cf. O3). 
After evaluating above-mentioned hypotheses in a simulation with a relatively high δ , we vary the level of the surplus in 
order to verify how different levels of δ  influence H1-H3.  
SIMULATION 
We apply a simulation approach to verify the hypotheses stated in the last section. Agents form or sever links based on their 
utility improvement or deterioration resulting from their action accomplished. 
Simulation Model  
The problem is modeled as an N -person game. Let iv
ω  denote that vendor iv  belongs to cluster {1,..., }Kω∈ . V ω  denotes 
the set of nodes in cluster ω . Edges are only possible between nodes of consecutive clusters. Generally, each iv V∈  must at 
least have one incoming and one outgoing edge to be situated on a path lF F∈ . 
In each period {1,...., }t T∈  each provider iv  chooses an action out of its action set iB . iB  is defined as all possible 
combinations of links to service providers of the preceding functionality cluster. That is, assuming 1| | 2V ω− =  and 
1 { , }h jV v v
ω− = , the action set iB  of vendor iv V ω∈  contains four entries: No links, link to hv , link to jv , and links to both 
preceding services. We binary code iB  as follows: {00,01,10,11}iB = . 
The payment tir  of vendor iv  at time t  is dependent on the network topology, the vendor’s action, and the actions taken by 
all other participants in the network.  
We apply reinforcement learning to evaluate and evolve actions over time. Each node iv  assigns a fitness value ,i bφ  to each 
possible action ib B∈ . The fitness of the chosen action at t  is updated at the end of each period according to the following 
update rule which depends on the feedback tir  of the chosen action: 
1
, ,( 1) ( )
t t t
i b i b irφ β φ β−= − ⋅ + ⋅ . The learning rate [0;1]β ∈  
controls the impact of the current feedback on the fitness of the chosen action. For simplicity, switching costs are 
disregarded. 
Actions are chosen according to a probability choice rule q  based on the action’s fitness and the fitness of each other action: 
( ) ,,
,
i
i
t
i bt
i b t
i bB
q
φφ φ= ∑ . 
After each node has decided upon its action based on ( ),ti bq φ , the payments are computed and fed back to the nodes which 
then update their fitness3.  
                                                          
3 If a vendor drops out of the network on behalf of another vendor’s action, the feedback (i.e. a zero-payment) is disregarded. 
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Simulation Setting 
We create networks with | | 3ω =  and | | 4V ω = . The prices per link are drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval 
[0.1;1]  and are assigned to all possible links in the network except for incoming edges of the sink. The number of initially 
activated links is determined by the initial link density. The density is set to 0.5  ( 50%  link activation). Other levels of 
density (varying from 0.25 to 1.0 ) were tested, however, did not yield different results. The learning rate is set to 0.1β = . In 
order to eliminate side effects caused by a small β , we perform a sufficiently high number of simulation rounds as described 
in the paragraph below. 
The simulation is divided into a training phase to pre-evaluate the actions of the vendors and a simultaneous4 run phase. For 
the PR-based payment, the starting value of the fitness function is simply defined by , :
init P P
i
R
b irφ = , given each possible action 
of service provider iv  and its impact on the links activated in the starting topology 
initG . This result is comparable to a 
sufficiently long training phase. For AP, each node goes through a training phase of 200T =  runs, given the remaining nodes 
and their incoming edges are held constant according to initG . We then conduct 4000T =  simultaneous runs5. Each 
simulation includes PRP and AP in parallel, starting with the same topology and initially activated links. Per round, each 
vendor iv  chooses a ib B∈ . To rule out learning effects that go beyond the learning phase due to the simultaneous choice of 
actions, we merely consult the last 2000  runs for the interpretation of the results. Altogether, we conduct 30 of the above 
described simulations, each with a different starting topology.  
To basically asses our results, we set * ,  1.0FPδ ε ε= ⋅ = , that is the amount totally distributed is twice the price of the 
complex service allocated. However, as indicated in the first section, δ  needs to be sponsored by the platform operator as a 
network development measure. Therefore we re-ran the simulation using a simplified setting with halved number of 
simulation series (i.e. 15)  and halved numbers of simulation runs ( 2000T = , consulting the last 1000  runs for the 
interpretation of the results) and additionally considered lower *FPδ ε= ⋅ with {0.01,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2,0.25,0.3,0.5,0.75}ε = . 
We are aware that the underlying assumptions of the simulation model and setting are simplified and can cover the 
complexity of real world SVNs only to some extent. However, the interval chosen for the initialization of prices in 
connection with the consideration of a relative δ  allows for a high degree of generalizability of our simulation approach. 
Assessment of Results and Implications 
In this section, we elaborate our research hypotheses. We consult characteristic measures to analyze each of the three 
statements. 
H1 states that PRP promotes diminished concentration. To evaluate H1, we consider statistical measures of concentration. On 
the one hand, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index ( )HHI 6 shall shed light on a vendor’s payment in relation to the overall 
distributed payments. On the other hand, we utilize the Gini coefficient ( )GC 7 as a measure of inequality of wealth. By H2 
we state that PRP accounts for increased dynamics in the SVN. To investigate this question, we consider the amount of 
switches of *F , i.e. a provisioning of the allocated complex service in t  by a different set of vendors than in 1t − . Finally, 
H3 postulates an increased degree of variety in case of PRP. Transferred to our formalization of SVNs, a high degree of 
variety is reflected by a large number of links in relation to all possible links. We therefore measure the degree of variety by 
the density of the resulting graphs of the SVN. The density puts the actual number of existing links in relation to the 
maximum possible number of links. Table 1 shows the descriptive and inductive results of the simulation conducted. For all 
characteristic measures, we firstly calculated the mean within one simulation phase and then aggregated these 30 values to 
                                                          
4 That is, service providers choose their actions simultaneously. 
5 However, tests incorporating a varying number of simulation runs showed that the network converges to stable results after approximately 
2000  runs. 
6 { }1 ,1HHI n∈ , whereas 0.18HHI >  denotes a high degree of concentration and 0.1HHI <  indicates little concentration. 
7 The closer the Gini coefficient converges to 1 , the greater the inequality of distributed values. A coefficient close to 0  denotes a 
perfectly equal distribution. 
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one average mean ( )μ  and its corresponding standard deviation ( )σ  for both the PRP and the AP setting. In order to verify 
our hypotheses, we performed a single-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test8.  
 
PRP AP Hypo-
thesis 
Wilcoxon 
rank-sum 
test μ  σ  μ  σ  
Herfindahl 
index 0.105  0.009  0.308  0.059  H1 p 0.02<<  
Gini 
coefficient 0.262  0.049  0.729  0.047  H1 p 0.02<<  
Number of 
*F switches 1316.2
 113.7  634.7  411.3  H2 p 0.02<<  
Density of 
network 0.775  0.002  0.719  0.022  H3 p 0.02<<  
Table 1. Simulation Results 
Concerning H1, PR-based payment leads to a HHI of 0.105 , which is very close to the assumption of little concentration 
whereas allocation-based payment leads to a highly concentrated wealth. In analogy to the HHI , the Gini coefficient for PRP 
0.2347PRPGC =  indicates a much more balanced wealth distribution than for AP, where 0.7344APGC =  signalizes a highly 
uneven revenue distribution. Both results significantly support H1 – which coincides with the nature of PRP as the power 
ratio is to broadly reward contributions to the network topology. Thereby, PRP fosters competition. Service providers that are 
(temporarily) not situated on the best path are more likely to retain in the network and represent competitors for frequently 
allocated vendors. In case of allocation-based payments, service providers that are never allocated play arbitrary actions each 
round ,(i.e. 0 for each )i b ib Bφ → ∈ . So, if these providers are offered an outside option yielding positive value, they will 
walk away. 
H2 can be accepted as well since the number of switches of *F  is significantly higher in the case of PR-based payment. On 
average, the best path alters every 3.5  rounds in case of AP. Applying PRP, the switching rate is 1.5 . Generally, the network 
using AP is more static. PR-based payment promotes dynamic allocation of different paths over time which lets more 
different service providers be part of the actual service provided.  
In terms of H3, the density of the network topology is on average 77.5%  in case of PRP and 71.9% when the payment is 
merely based upon allocation. We can conclude that above-described behavior occurs systematically since the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test shows significance with p<<0.02 . Therefore, PRP is a suitable measure to promote highly interconnected 
networks. These interconnections increase interaction by incentivizing service providers to pursue a cooperation strategy that 
involves the creation of more links than in environments based on AP.  
We additionally considered *FPδ ε= ⋅  with {0.01,0.05,0.1,0.15,0.2,0.25,0.3,0.5,0.75}ε =  to analyze the behavior of PRP 
subject to varied surpluses. Interestingly, H3 is invariant in respect to ε . The resulting density applying PRP is constantly 
between 77.2%  and 78.8% . We can state that H3 applies for 0.01ε ≥ . However, H1 and H2 are closely linked to the level 
of ε . H1 cannot be supported for 0.15ε < . Also, we cannot state higher agility (H2) using PRP for 0.25ε < . In connection 
with the larger number of links (cp. H3), we conclude that these must not necessarily be the ones to promote H1 and H2. 
With increasing ε , the number of path switches as well as the tendency towards equal distribution rises. For 0.3ε = , H2 
shows significance to a 5%  level. Taking these settings as a basis for a judgment of the required level of ε  in order to reach 
objectives O1, O2, and O3, the platform operator needs to grant at least an additional 30%  surplus to be distributed via PR-
based payments. 
We infer from above-mentioned results that PR-based payments are a promising instrument to diminish concentration (O1) 
and foster agility (O2) and variety (O3) in SVNs if the PR-based surplus is set sufficiently high. Due to the application of 
concepts from cooperative game theory, the PRP rule is particularly suitable to deal with coordination in ecosystem-like 
environments like SVNs. Participants are both self-interested, but also depend on the performance of the whole system. 
                                                          
8 We performed Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests showing that the underlying data significantly deviates from the Gaussian distribution with a 
99% probability. Therefore, t-tests (that require normally distributed data) are not applicable. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this paper we argued that the fundamental change from a product-oriented to a service-oriented economy fosters the 
formation of service value networks, as for example, is evident in the software sector. For such SVNs, we presented a model 
to express the power ratio (PR) of vendors. This model then served as the basis for a PR-based payment (PRP) rule that 
distributes generated revenue to all network participants dependent on their overall contribution to the network topology. 
This payment scheme was introduced as a lever for the platform provider to push the network towards a more variable and 
dynamic structure and to diminish concentration of revenues. In order to evaluate the effects of PRP, we conducted a 
simulation and compared PRP to a simply allocation-based payment (AP) rule. We were able to show that PRP can foster the 
desirable goals mentioned above. Generally, these effects were shown with striking significance for a high surplus. However, 
variety and agility effects decreased with lower surpluses. We conclude that, especially in launching and consolidation phases 
of SVNs, a payment scheme based upon participants’ contribution to the networks’ infrastructure is a promising alternative to 
traditional performance-based revenue distribution if set sufficiently high. 
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